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Critical Law and Development 
Fiona Macmillan 
 
The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual 
landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crime 
have been the steady companions of development and they tell a 




Introduction: the “development crisis” 
It is not uncommon to hear the international development project being referred 
to in terms of crisis. Strangely, however, the use of the word crisis in this 
context often seems to be somewhat non-urgent. After all, if the development 
project really is in crisis then it is a crisis that has been in course since at least 
the end of the Second World War. A very good case could even be made for the 
proposition that this crisis significantly predates the post-war decolonization 
process and, in fact, dates back to the colonial period. In 1922 Lord Lugard, a 
prominent colonial administrator, articulated the so-called “dual mandate” 
according to which colonialism was justified as part of the universal historical 
mission of the imperial powers, which were under two moral duties:
2
 “to bring 
the blessings of Western civilisation to the inhabitants of the tropics and to 
activate neglected resources in ‘backward’ countries for the benefit of the world 
economy”.3 As this chapter will argue, with some modifications, these two 
principles continue to be central to the development project, which has not only 
failed to address its own crisis, but has also failed abysmally to address the 
crisis faced by a significant portion of the inhabitants of the planet. 
Failing to understand the urgency of the development crisis somehow reflects 
the failure of the whole project. As if it does not matter: that millions of people 
have been deprived of their social, cultural, political, economic and legal 
autonomy, not to mention the most basic of life’s necessities; that after the 
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succession of endless ideas, emerging from some strange coalition of theory and 
institutional politics, about what development might mean, or should be, we 
seem to have made no appreciable gains in achieving it in practice or even being 
quite sure what it is; that since the Washington Consensus, even that most 
arbitrary and unsatisfactory mode of measuring so-called development, by 
economic growth, has shown that the gap between developed and developing 
economies has on average grown for the first time since the end of the Second 
World War.
4 Despite the plethora of international, intergovernmental and 
governmental bodies specifically dedicated to the development project, despite 
the focussed attention to the question from nearly every other international and 
intergovernmental institution, despite an industry of non-governmental 
organizations and civil society organizations working tirelessly, despite the 
combined efforts of the world’s social, political, legal and economic elite 
gathered together annually at Davos under the auspices of the World Economic 
Forum,
5
 in other words despite the endless resources of all types poured into the 
development project, achieving – or imposing – development has proved 
remarkably elusive. Consequently, millions of people continue to live in 
material conditions that are unacceptable by any standard of decency. 
On the other hand, as crises go this has been a rather successful one for the 
West.
6 The failure of the development process has allowed the Western world to 
maintain most of its historic geo-political and material advantages, while at the 
same time leveraging the consequent weakness of the so-called developing 
world in order to find new ways of extracting resources and capital on 
advantageous terms. Understood this way, one might argue that the real crisis is 
that the enormous apparatus of the international development project is the very 
reason that a significant part of the planet continues to live in unacceptable 
material conditions. The role of law in this apparatus, both as a means of 
exporting Western norms and as a means of extracting resources on 
advantageous terms, is central. The pivotal issue here turns on the process by 
which the globalization of Western law, in the form of international law, has 
mediated the connection between colonialism and capitalism in the post-World 
War Two period. 
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International Law and the Post-Colonial Capitalist System 
 
1. Division between the political and the economic 
 
The current international legal order, which has emerged since the end of the 
Second World War, embraces a kind of schism between international economic 
law and public international law.
7
 The United Nations organizations, which 
form the framework for what is referred to here as public international law, 
arose from the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations. The institutions of international 
economic law emerged from the Bretton Woods negotiations, which drew up 
the charters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Fund 
for Reconstruction and Development (which became the World Bank), and the 
International Trade Organization. From the beginning, the mandates of these 
two systems of international law were distinct. The Dumbarton Oaks 
institutions were to manage the international political order while the Bretton 
Woods institutions were to manage international economic relations. Thus, the 
Dumbarton Oaks institutions have taken charge of what have been described as 
“state-making and war-making” functions.8 In addition to this, the system of 
public international law that has been built up around the Dumbarton Oaks 
institutions has purported to establish international standards in areas such as 
the protection of human rights and of the environment. 
This bifurcation of international law along the lines of the putative division 
between the political and the economic appears to be rooted in the origins of the 
Westphalia System. The principle that quarrels between sovereigns did not 
implicate non-combatant civilians was built into the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648.
9
 As a consequence, the treaties that built upon the Settlement of 
Westphalia abolished trade barriers and sought to protect the rights of private 
enterprises to trade across state borders, even during times of war or other 
political turmoil. Arrighi remarks that “[t]his reorganization of political space in 
the interest of capital accumulation marks the birth not just of the modern inter-
state system, but also of capitalism as world system”.10 
Arrighi is far from being the only prominent commentator to have noticed that 
this division between the political and the economic is critical to the modern 
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system of global capitalism.
11
 This observation is fundamental to Hirschman’s 
argument that amongst eighteenth century European political philosophers, 
making particular reference to Montesquieu and Sir James Steuart, the division 
between the political and the economic was essential to controlling the power of 
despotic rulers in the pre-democratic period. The essential point here is that, at 
least in the pre-democratic period this division was a political question in the 
sense that the power of the economic system was regarded as a constraint on the 
operation of the political system. In the nineteenth century, however, when 
Western politics had developed its own forms of democratic restraint, the 
economic system was liberated from its role in politics. However, instead of 
democratic politics taking up the role of constraining the power of the economic 
system, under the influence of the neoclassical economists and the political 
economists that founded the Austrian School the global capitalist system was 
liberated from much in the way of political restraint and so effectively de-
politicized.
12
 Bearing in mind that the system of international law that was 
remade at the end of the Second World War reflects the systemic division 
between the political and the economic, the de-politicization of the idea of the 
economic is crucial to understanding both the role of international economic 
law in relation to global capitalism and the place of the development project 
within the global capitalist system.  With this point in mind, this chapter now 
turns to a closer engagement with the system of international economic law 
inaugurated at Bretton Woods. 
 
2. The Bretton Woods System 
 
The surviving Bretton Woods institutions are the IMF and the World Bank.  
Despite being the progeny of Franklin D Roosevelt’s “one-worldism”, the 
International Trade Organization never came into existence. Its death knell was 
the intense opposition that it engendered in the United States,
13
 although the 
political and business interests ranged against it were not confined to those 
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emanating from the US.
14
 However, it metamorphosed into the 1947 version of 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and was, accordingly, a 
precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Together the IMF, the 
World Bank and the World Trade Organization make up what has been 
described as the “unholy trinity”15 of international economic law institutions. 
Each of these institutions has had, explicitly or implicitly, a significant role of 
the development project. This is perhaps most obvious in the role of the World 
Bank, which has a specific mandate with respect to development. Since the 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate system and the loss of its central function, 
the IMF has increasingly turned its attention to the question of development.  
Nowadays many of the explicit development strategies and policies are jointly 
operated by the IMF and the World Bank, and it can be no surprise that many of 
the most famous development disasters can claim a similar heritage.
16
 
The role of the WTO is somewhat different as it has no specific mandate in 
relation to development, apart from a rather vague reference in the preamble to 
its constitutional agreement that refer to its role in the promotion of “sustainable 
development”, which presumably grounds the provisions in the WTO covered 
agreements on “special and differential treatment” (SDT) for developing 
countries.
17
 However, its role in the development debacle is more extensive than 
its constituent documents might lead one to believe. To understand this it is 
useful to make a brief reference to its antecedents, the failed International Trade 
Organization and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Both 
the rejection of the International Trade Organization in the post-war period, and 
the subsequent arrival of the WTO fifty years later, are part of a continuous 
process driven by the needs of capital accumulation. After the Second World 
War the introduction of a system of multilateral free trade was postponed in 
favour of the GATT’s framework for the negotiation, on either a multilateral or 
bilateral basis, of the reduction of restrictions on international trade in goods. 
This is entirely consistent with the fact that the US embrace of free trade has 
always been largely rhetorical. Using the GATT, the US government was able 
to control the process of trade liberalization in ways that benefited US interests 
by internalizing international trade within the vertically integrated structures of 
multinational corporations. In this way, post-war international markets were 
reconstructed through the engine of foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than 
through “free trade”.  This is the beginning of the process which, as Arrighi 
notes, means that by the 1970s transnational corporations “had developed into a 
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world-scale system of production, exchange and accumulation, which was 
subject to no state authority and had the power to subject to its own ‘laws’ each 
and every member of the inter-state system”.18 So transnational capital neither 
needed nor wanted “free trade” in post-war period.  The need for a selective free 
trade regime comes later in the US period of dominance and, as is argued 
below, is directly connected the process of capital accumulation and the 
generation of interstate competition for mobile capital. 
 
3. Fragmentation and de-politicization 
 
In the present context there are two important consequences of the split between 
the political and the economic in the international law system. One of these, the 
de-politicization of international economic law, has already been mentioned but 
is worth some further attention. This is particularly so since the other important 
– if somewhat obvious – consequence, fragmentation of regulation, operates in 
tandem with de-politicization. The two are mutually supportive. The 
international law principles governing human rights, labour rights and 
development are, along with the protection of the environment, particularly 
affected by the fragmentation of regulation.  Arguably different concepts of 
human rights, for example, operate in the two parts of the system.
19
  Maybe 
even worse, labour rights seem to have completely disappeared from the 
international economic law system. And specifically in relation to development, 
the dedicated instrumentalities are all part of the United Nations system, but the 
real action (or damage) is taking place in the international economic law 
system. 
This fragmentation and de-politicization has enabled the imposition of 
conditions attached to lending by the World Bank and the IMF (the Bretton 
Woods institutions) in their role as lenders (often of last resort) to states. 
Structural adjustment using loan conditionality has become one of the famous 
ways in which these institutions put pressure on developing countries (and other 
countries in need of emergency finance) to change their laws and institutions.
20
 
Distressing cases of the damage caused by this type of loan conditionality 
abound.
21
 Conditionality has also crept into the aid agenda where it has been 
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used in relation to debt relief initiatives.
22
 The conditional lending practices of 
the Bretton Woods institutions have changed their form over time, but the 
substance remains largely the same. Not only do these forms of conditionality 
require the Westernization of the law and institutions of the recipient states, 
they also reflect the tenets of the Washington Consensus and so are driven by 
ideas like reduction of the public sector, low taxation, privatization of public 
services, limitation – or even elimination – of labour standards, liberalization of 
inward FDI, and austerity. However, even within this strait-jacket there is 
considerable room for variation and manoeuvre with respect to the type of 
conditionality imposed. Interesting work has been done on so-called rule of law 
conditionality that shows that the idea of “the rule of law” in Bretton Woods 
rule of law conditionality, while being resolutely Western, differs substantially 
between instrumental (as suggested, for example, by Weber and Hayek) and 
intrinsic (for example, Dicey and Sen), and between institutional (for example, 
Weber and Dicey) and substantive (for example, Hayek and Sen)).
23
 It does not 
seem unreasonable to suggest that a particular form of rule of law conditionality 
does not exist because we in the West have a political view that some versions 
of rule of law are better than others, but rather because some types of rule of 
law conditionality in certain circumstances fit better with the needs of global 
capital than others. 
The use of the concept of the rule of law as a means to facilitate capital 
accumulation and drive interstate competition for mobile capital has also been 
achieved through WTO obligations, which require national laws to be brought 
into conformity with WTO rules.  Here we can see the mutually supportive 
relationship between homogenisation of markets through “free trade” and 
homogenisation of law. The effects of the fragmented system of international 
law and the de-politicization of international economic law are also fundamental 
in relation to the WTO. While the Bretton Woods institutions have, for 
example, developed their own concepts of human rights in order to discipline 
states to which they have given financial accommodation, the World Trade 
Organization appears to embrace the position that things like human rights and 
labour standards are simply outside its sphere of operation. Perhaps the honesty 
is refreshing, but the failure to acknowledge its role in the perpetuation of 
human misery as a result of downward pressure on labour standards, which are 
seen as constituting non-tariff barriers to trade, is not appealing. 
 
4. Decolonization 
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A critically important process that informs the birth of the international 
economic law system, and especially its entanglement with development, is the 
process of decolonization, which begins after the Second World War and the 
remaking of the international law system. Thus, the first and most obvious point 
to make about this process is that the former colonies, which today have a 
substantial degree of identity with those states usually described as 
“developing” or “least developed”,24 had no role in the diplomatic conferences 
at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods and so no role in the remaking of the 
system into which they were born as new states. The remaking of the system 
was, of course, led by the US, which had emerged as the leading global power 
after the Second World War, displacing Great Britain, the leading imperial 
power of the nineteenth century. 
The terms of the new relationship between the states comprising the great 
metropolitan powers, their satellites, and the rest of the “developing” world 
were set by the leader of the greatest power, President Harry S Truman, when 
he famously gave voice to the concept of “underdevelopment”.  In a speech of 
20 January 1949 he said: 
We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of 
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.  The old imperialism 
– exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans.  What we 




Of course, all this could only happen if the decolonising and newly emerging 
states were woven into the fabric of the newly remade international law system. 
The chronological coincidence of the invention of the concept of development, 
with its consequent drive to enmesh newly decolonizing states in the remade 
system of international law, and the process of decolonization are not 
accidental.
26
 In particular, the loss of the colonies presented the former imperial 
powers and the new hegemon, the US, with the problem of how to continue to 
extract resources on favourable terms.
27
 This question of extraction of resources 
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is a critical theme in international economic law in a number of ways. First, the 
principle of most favoured nation (MFN) treatment in WTO law operates to 
protect extraction of primary resources by countries lacking them on favourable 
terms. Secondly, the doctrine of comparative advantage upon which the idea of 
free international trade is based (and more on this shortly) has forced many 
resource rich countries, mostly from the global south, into the position of 
suppliers of primary resources without having the opportunity to develop 
manufacturing capacity.  This has undoubtedly meant that such states have been 
unable to extract some of the economic benefits that might have flowed from 
participation in the capitalist system.
28
 Thirdly, extraction of biological and 
knowledge-based resources seems to be one of the primary drivers behind the 
international patent system, which was reinforced with the conclusion of the 
WTO and its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the 
TRIPs Agreement). If we accept the very plausible proposition that the WTO 
exists partly because of the two new major trade agreements that were created 
within its structure, the TRIPs Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS)
29
 (and more on this shortly as well), we might reasonably 
hypothesize that extraction of resources is one of the underlying concerns of the 
WTO system. Fourthly, the system overall operates to extract capital from the 
global south.  From the beginning of the period of decolonization it was 
necessary to enmesh the newly created states within both the international law 
system and, concomitantly, the capitalist system, by making them somehow 
dependent on these systems and the powerful states within them. Not only 
would this ensure that these states would provide markets for Western 
manufactured products and thus extract capital from them, but it would also 
operate to control and discipline them.  The internalization of trade within the 
domains of multinational corporations, which forms part of the post Second 
World War global economic landscape, has also operated to extract capital and 
other resources. This is because the direct relationship between multinational 
corporations and states of the global south has mostly taken place through a 
process of FDI, often on extremely disadvantageous terms.
30
 The net result is 
that more capital and other resources go out than in. 
 
5. Development as neo-colonialism 
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Hopefully, at this point, more or less half way through the chapter, the case for 
development as neo-colonialism is beginning to emerge. In the dual mandate of 
Lord Lugard “justifying” colonial rule31 we can see the two threads that not only 
create continuity between colonialism and the concept of development, but also 
hold together the story of international economic law. Colonialism was par 
excellence, the export of Western concepts of the rule of law.
32
 The 
extraordinary spread of the common law system in the Commonwealth 
countries, formerly colonies of Great Britain, is a tribute to the success of this 
project. In this way, in accordance with the first part of the Lugardian mandate, 
the “blessings of civilization” were dispersed through the Empire. The post-
colonial period has witnessed a comparable process through two central devices 
of international economic law. One of these is loan conditionality
33
 and the 
other is the requirement for states to bring their law into compliance with WTO 
standards. So far as the second part of the colonial dual mandate is concerned, 
the extraction of resources is a key factor in driving both the colonial enterprise 
and the development enterprise. The change in the political status of the former 
colonies after decolonization meant, however, that the task of extraction could 
no longer be achieved by simple plunder, rather recourse for this purpose has 
been made to international economic law. 
While there is much debate about its desirability and morality, there seems to be 
very little debate about the fact of the relationship between the development 
project, including that part of it concerned with access to resources, and 
capitalist expansion. There is, on the other hand, a considerable amount of 
dispute and historical revision over the question of the extent to which the 
colonial project was driven by capitalist expansion. In a rather obvious sense, 
however, the argument that development is neo-colonialism depends on 
establishing this link between the colonial and post-colonial periods. The 
argument, at least recently, that the significance of the capitalist impulse in the 
colonial period has been exaggerated tends to depend upon the claim that 
imperialism was a state, rather than an entrepreneurial capitalist, project.
34
 
However, this position critically underestimates the extent to which capital 
accumulation and state power were, and continue to be, linked. This is so even 
if the nature of the relationship between states and multinational enterprises has 
altered radically during the US period of dominance. In the colonial period this 
relationship was expressed through the joint stock corporations, which were 
state backed trading enterprises, the role of which was to advance both empire 
and capitalist expansion. These corporations were features of the international 
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trade landscape since at least the establishment of the English East India 
Company in 1600 and its Dutch counterpart, the Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie (VOC), in 1602.
35
 
Arrighi, in particular recognises the role of these corporations in his argument 
that capitalism is a history of cycles of capitalist accumulation (meaning success 
in attracting mobile capital) dominated by a leading agency of capital 
accumulation in the form of a state.
36
 The current dominant agency of capital 
accumulation is, of course, the US, which is the fourth of the cycles identified 
by Arrighi, and was preceded by the Genoese, Dutch and British dominated 
cycles. He links these cycles to the continual expansion of international trade 
and its domination by the leading state agency of capital accumulation. Thus, 
the trade ascendancy of the VOC in the seventeenth century was, like the power 
of the Dutch Empire, on the wane by the middle of the eighteenth century.
37
 At 
this time, as the British Empire superseded the Dutch, the English joint stock 
companies began their domination of international trade. 
In Arrighi’s theory each of these cycles of state led capital accumulation follows 
the same trajectory. That is, when capital can longer be profitably employed by 
use in the development of new markets that expand the productive capacity of 
the existing markets, then a switch occurs and excess profits are ploughed into 
the trade in money. That is, a switch is made from trade to finance. 
The switch is the expression of a “crisis” in the sense that it marks a 
“turning point”, a “crucial time of decision,” when the leading agency of 
systemic processes of capital accumulation reveals, through the switch, a 
negative judgment on the possibility of continuing to profit from the 
reinvestment of surplus capital in the material expansion of the world 
economy, as well as a positive judgment on the possibility of prolonging 
in time and space its leadership/dominance through a greater 
specialization in high finance.
38
 
Arrighi argues that interstate competition for mobile capital has been essential 
to the material expansion of the capitalist world economy. However, Arrighi’s 
gloss to this proposition is that capitalist power has intensified during each 
period of capitalist accumulation.
39
 So returning to the relationship between 
colonialism and capitalism, it is arguable that what happens in the colonial 
period is that, due to this intensification, international capitalism becomes part 
of the engine of state power in a way that was not seen before. 
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6. The New International Economic Order and “neoliberalism” 
 
This seems like a good moment to pass onto a consideration of the current US-
dominated cycle of capitalist accumulation. The key historical moments of this 
cycle are, first, the end of the Cold war and the Pax Americana or Washington 
Consensus, and secondly, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations leading to 
the creation of the WTO in 1994.  But the important phenomenon of the entire 
American period is the modern multinational corporate enterprise, which is very 
much a creature of the constant intensification of capitalist power identified by 
Arrighi. The pre-condition of the ascendancy of the multinational enterprise was 
the twentieth century processes of vertical integration and internalization of 
international trade within those enterprises. And the dominance of multinational 
enterprises is crucially linked to interstate competition for investment and its 
adverse effects on countries of the global South because it is this that puts 




The so-called developing world did start to re-organize and fight back, agitating 
for changes in the world system to equal the unequal economic playing field, 
under the banner of a call for the famous, but never appearing, New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). This campaign was well placed to take 
advantage of the interruption to the process of corporate-led globalization as a 
result of the so-called “exogenous shocks” of the 1970s and 1980s, including 
the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system established under the auspices of 
the IMF and the OPEC crisis. As a result of these shocks, many states 
introduced non-tariff barriers to protect domestic production, which included 
things like labour rights, environmental protection, limits on the entry of foreign 
capital and differential taxation systems for foreign multinational corporations. 
The NIEO, however, never appeared for the very simple reason that a political 
decision was taken to create the conditions for the re-intensification of 
corporate-led globalization and expansion of the capitalist system.  This is a 
decision that we commonly call the Washington Consensus, which imposed on 
states fiscal discipline, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, trade 
liberalization, liberalization of inward FDI, reduction and redirection of public 
expenditure, deregulation, privatization and a religious zeal for the security of 
property rights.  In the end, the only new international economic order to 
emerge was what is now referred to as neoliberalism. 
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7. The Uruguay Round, the WTO and Comparative Advantage 
The Washington Consensus coincides historically with the beginning of the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which was primarily concerned with 
three things: first, removal of these “non-tariff barriers”, which had been 
inhibiting the growth of international trade; secondly, putting in place a global 
intellectual property regime; and, thirdly, liberalizing trade in services, 
including financial services. These negotiations culminated in the birth of the 
WTO, which claims to promote free international trade based on the concept of 
comparative advantage, a doctrine of classical economics into which the 
neoliberal spirit has breathed new life. Derived from the ideas of Adam Smith 
and David Riccardo,
41
 the modern version of the doctrine postulates that that 
optimal allocation of international resources will be achieved if each country 
uses its comparative advantage to produce only the commodities that it can most 
efficiently produce and trades those commodities with other countries in order 
to obtain the commodities that it does not produce.
42
 Essentially, therefore, the 
argument is one about optimal allocation of resources as a consequence of the 
operation of an unfettered market mechanism. Ultimately, it is argued, that 
where there is optimal allocation of resources then economic welfare will be 
maximised. It is also frequently argued that economic growth will be stimulated 
and everyone will be better off in economic terms. However, even some 
prominent free trade advocates are doubtful about this proposition.
43
 Non-
economic benefits in the form of greater international cooperation and harmony 
are also postulated by adherents of the doctrine of comparative advantage and 
its concomitant of international trade free from government interference.
44
 
These non-economic benefits would, it is argued, flow from the fact of 
economic interdependence. 
 
Leaving aside the deleterious social and welfare consequences of this doctrine, 
beautifully critiqued by Keynes and further addressed below,
45
 a serious 
problem about its current applicability relates to its assumption that capital, 
along with skilled labour, is largely immobile.
46
  The efficiency and welfare 
advantages predicted by the doctrine are based upon the movement of traded 
commodities, in the form of raw materials and manufactured goods, across 
borders.  The twentieth century, however, marked an increase (that has 
continued unabated into the twenty first century) in the movement of the means 
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of production across borders.  This generally occurs by means of FDI by 
multinational enterprises, which establish subsidiary undertakings in another 
country for this purpose. 
In order to make some sense of these developments in systemic terms, it is 
useful to revisit one of Arrighi’s insights, which is that every cycle of capitalist 
accumulation has a signal point when the profits derived from trade become so 
poor that money switches from trade to investment capital.  For the British 
dominated cycle the so-called signal point, when the profits derived from trade 
become so poor that money was switched from trade to investment capital, 
came as the result of the intensification of competition from Germany and the 
US consequent upon the depression of 1873 to 1896.  For the Americans, in the 
1970s and 1980s, the signal point was the economic challenge from Japan.  
These signal points and their accompanying switches are autumnal and 
generally inaugurate a period of economic turbulence.  They do not, however, 
spell the immediate end of the dominant regime of capital accumulation.
47
 In 
both cycles, the response of the dominant agency of capital accumulation to 
these signal points led to the establishment of international “free” trade 




In the current turbulent stage Arrighi argues that a combination of structural 
changes in the form of “the withering away of the modern system of territorial 
states as the primary locus of world power”, “the internalisation of world-scale 
processes of production and exchange within the organizational domains of 
transnational corporations” and “the resurgence of suprastatal world financial 
markets” have created a pressure to relocate state authority and counter 
systemic chaos through a process of world government formation.
49
 Going 
further and reflecting on the nature and ideology of the WTO, do these represent 
an attempt on the part of the US, in its death throes as the dominant agency of 
capitalist accumulation, to control interstate competition for mobile capital?  
Certainly, the chronological coincidence between Arrighi’s post-switch phase in 
the US cycle of capital accumulation and the Uruguay Round negotiations is 
striking, as is the fact that the two new Uruguay Round agreements, the TRIPs 
Agreement and the GATS, are quite conceivably conceptualised as being 




8. Developing countries in the global capitalist system 
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For developing countries, loan conditionality and structural adjustment 
requirements imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions, and also by the WTO 
as a condition of entry into the WTO system, are generally connected to gearing 
up for comparative advantage. This is notwithstanding the cogent criticisms that 
have been made about the ability of the doctrine of comparative advantage to 
deal with the obvious global disadvantage of developing countries.
51
 The 
concern here, as Dunkley notes, is that “in a world of uneven development free 
trade, or even trade per se, may be inherently unequalising”.52 There is a range 
of economic arguments that explain why the doctrine of comparative advantage 
may be unable to deliver its promised welfare benefits to developing countries. 
One of the important general arguments in this context is that comparative 
advantage is created and cumulative, rather than natural.
53
 If this is so, then the 
cumulative comparative advantage of developed countries will ensure either 
that inequalities always remain or that they take an unacceptably long time to 
disappear. Another important school of economic thought postulates perpetual 
inequalities as a consequence of free trade. According to this argument, where 
there is low elasticity in demand for the exports of a country but high elasticity 
in domestic demand for imports, then export prices relative to import prices will 
result in a continuous trade deficit.
54
 As this tends to describe the terms upon 
which at least some developing countries export their primary products and 
import manufactured products, this means that under free trade conditions these 
developing countries will remain trapped in a trade deficit preventing them from 
realising the welfare gains promised by free trade doctrine.
55
 
It is, accordingly, the theory of comparative advantage and its concomitant 
doctrine of free trade that keep developing countries in the same economic 
position they have always been in: suppliers of primary products or suppliers of 
manufactured products made on the back of often appalling labour, 
environmental and human rights conditions. Domestic regulation to improve 
standards in these areas is not only directly constrained by the legal obligations 
placed on states through the international economic law system, but also by the 
need to survive in the international capitalist system by competing for mobile 
capital through FDI. The dominant state agencies, using the system of 
international economic law, have rigged the rules to give themselves a vast 
competitive advantage in the attraction of interstate mobile capital.
56
  This 
rigging of the rules is quite consistent with the fact that the WTO is not really a 
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free trade organization in any case. The GATT, for example, does not eliminate 
tariffs, but rather limits them subject to an exhortation to member states to 
reduce them over time.  The latitude that this provides has been used by 
powerful states to keep up protectionist barriers with respect to both primary 
and manufactured products in order to protect domestic markets from 
competition from products imported from states, usually from the global South, 
with relevant comparative advantage. An outrageous example is the US refusal 
to drop its tariffs on cotton products. These tariffs protect the US cotton based 
cotton industry from exports from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, which 
have comparative advantage in the growing of cotton.
57
 
The grotesque hypocrisy of the WTO - and of the powerful states that are 
responsible for the legal architecture of its agreements - aside, there is no 
compelling argument that things would be better for so-called developing 
countries in a true free trade regime. Apart from the economic arguments to this 
effect, some of which have already been canvassed, a free trade regime raises 
serious ethical concerns, especially in a vastly unequal world.  A particular issue 
here is the exploitation of labour, whether by multinational corporate interests 
or by domestically-based interests.  The general issue, however, is the way in 
which free trade doctrine regards wealth maximisation as the ultimate measure 
of human happiness and attainment. 
The critique of free trade based upon the rejection of wealth maximisation 
draws stark attention to the difficulty in attempting to divide the political and 
the economic. The decision to embrace a free trade regime is not, and can never 
be, a purely economic one.  Rather, it is a political choice involving, amongst 
other things, economic considerations. In their failure to understand this point, 
as in so much else, modern free trade theorists appear to be embracing a type of 
intellectual foreclosure that dates back to the work of Adam Smith. Smith 
postulated non-economic effects of free trade, both positive and negative. On 
the positive side, both he and Ricardo cited cosmopolitanism and international 
harmony as a non-economic benefit of free trade. Smith also saw that the 
pursuit of material wealth had less desirable effects.
58
 He was, however, unable 
to resolve the conflict between this concern and his commitment to the 
expansion of wealth, cosmopolitanism and international harmony through 
international trade. He consequently appears to conclude that the primary 
motivation of humankind is to better its material condition. This conclusion set 
the parameters to the post-Smithian debate about international trade, which has 
been conducted around the question of whether and to what extent international 
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trade is capable of improving material well-being.
59
  Somewhere along the way, 
the insidious idea that the maximization of material wealth is the ultimate 





Is There a Way Forward? 
As with free trade, so too with development: the idea of maximization of 
economic benefit as the Holy Grail has had a long history in development 
thinking. The early decades of international development policy were 
dominated by the idea that development meant an increase in gross national 
product.
61
 A cynic might suggest that either or both of the impossibility or 
undesirability of achieving economic parity for that part of the world said to be 
lacking development has meant that the predominance of economic 
development thinking has gradually given way to other discourses variously 
labelled as human development, popular development, reflexive development, 
alternative development and so on.
62
 Important contributions in understanding 
what a development process that is not dominated by economic objectives 





 Their “human capabilities” approach has been influential 
in the creation of the United Nations Development Programme Human 
Development Index.
65
  But none of this, desirable or not,
66
 can gain much 
traction in the divided system of international law.  As this chapter has sought to 
argue, whatever might be happening in the United Nations instrumentalities, the 
real theatre of development is international economic law.  And there “the idea 
that there are alternative development paths, and that therefore different pasts 
underlie different presents and may lead to different futures”67 has gained no 
traction, except in the sense that the future for the so-called developing world 
looks much bleaker than that of the future of the so-called developed world. 
In the context this debacle, strands of critical theory
68
 grouped under the rubric 
of post-development have (in the same sentence) been praised for their “acute 
intuitions” and criticized for “being directionless in the end, as a consequence of 
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the refusal to, or lack of interest in translating critique into construction”.69 This 
verdict views calls for “the expansion and articulation of anti-imperialist, anti-
capitalist, anti-productivist, anti-market struggles”70 as too aspirational and 
perhaps somehow lacking substance.
71
 But practice must be informed by theory, 
and construction by critique. The particular contribution of critical legal theory, 
as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, has been to understand how the 
history and architecture of the international law system has dictated the real 
terms of the development project. It is clear, however, that we urgently need a 
theoretical framework that can open up a path ahead. Hopefully, it goes without 
saying that a just path ahead requires the abandonment of the current divided 
system of international law and the de-coupling of international law and global 
capitalism. At this point, given the size and complexity of the task, it is easy to 
sympathise with theorists who have found themselves in difficulty in coming up 
with a constructive basis for advancing the battle. Nevertheless, in a spirit of 
grounded optimism (after so much pessimism), this chapter concludes by 
advancing two critical approaches, not necessarily completely mutually 
exclusive, that may indicate a way forward for critical legal theory in the 
development context. One of them focusses on a re-cast and re-invigorated role 
for the state and the other looks at ways of harnessing the power of global 
labour in order to create a more just global order. 
New developmentalism, which places the state at its strategic centre, is 
essentially neo-Keynesian.
72
 This means that new developmental theorists do 
not reject the idea of the market nor its role in capitalist growth. The particular 
target of new developmentalism is the Washington Consensus and the 
“neoliberal” policies introduced in its wake.  It has a primary concern with the 
question of how best to regulate the market “in order to achieve virtuous cycles 
of capitalist growth … devoid of the labour repression, climate change, gender 
inequality and state bureaucratisation characteristic of the first 
developmentalism”.73 The central tenets of new developmentalism, the state and 
the capitalist market, make it an easy target of critique. So far as its adoption of 
a virtuous capitalist market is concerned, the line of attack is fairly obvious and 
centres on (important) things like the role of capitalist markets in systematically 
oppressing workers and denying their rights,
74
 and the neo-imperialist nature of 
capitalism which means that it is inherently productive of uneven and combined 
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 This is married to a characterization of the state as being an 
inherently repressive apparatus resting on unacceptable “historical social 
relations of class, gender and race”.76 Marxist critique is rightly sceptical of the 
idealistic view of the state as the moderator, in the name of the some concept of 
the overall good, of capitalist development based on national comparative 
advantage.
77
 Nevertheless, for a critical legal theorist considering the possibility 
of an institutional model upon which to remake the international system perhaps 
the jettisoning of the concept of the state is a step in the wrong direction. 
Marxist theories of labour-led development offer it as both a form of resistance 
to the current form of capital-centred development and as a new theoretical 
framework for alternative development.
78
 It is evident, however, that despite 
their rejection of the capitalist state, this theoretical position does not jettison 
the concept of the state.  Instead this vision is represented by “the capturing, 
holding and transformation of state power”.79 Selwyn, following Marx, speaks 
of “the reabsorption of the state by society”80 but this does not mean the 
abolition of the state. Rather what is envisaged is, to paraphrase Marx, a 
political form of labour’s social emancipation. This is a concept of the state that 
is, therefore, liberated from the burden of its repressive history. Working within 
this concept, Selwyn offers a plan for labour-led democratic development as 
follows:
81
 banking, money and economic democracy; the introduction of a 
universal basic income; ecologically sustainable industrial policy; agrarian 
reform in order to ensure de-commodified food security; the protection of 
Indigenous Peoples and their knowledge; a non-aggressive foreign policy, 
which has both “political” aims (to establish links with other social movements 
and support equivalent transformations globally) and “economic” aims (to 
combat environmental destruction, control foreign trade and investment and use 
collective capacities at the international level with respect to trade and 
investment rules and environmental and labour standards);
82
 reduction and 
equalization work; the eliminating of gender inequality, nationalism and racism; 
and, de-commodified cultural production as a form of personal and collective 
development. 
Certainly, the concept of the state embedded in this vision shares no ground 
with the neoliberal idea of the state as one member of a constellation of actors, 
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including private sector actors. Here the state re-assumes importance as the 
central actor and carrier of a just and democratic vision. As should be obvious, 
however, this eminently desirable vision cloaks an enormous project for critical 
legal theory. Not only does it present a particular challenge to constitutional 
theorists, but in the context of the current chapter it can only be realised by the 
demolition (progressive or otherwise) of the post Second World War divided 
system of international law. (If Arrighi is right and we are now in the terminal 
stage of the US led cycle of capitalist accumulation perhaps we are already on 
the right track here.) A critical legal theory programme for international 
development must, in any case, aim to decouple development from both from 
the post-colonial constraints of the international law system and from its 
entanglement with the process of capital accumulation.  A good first step would 
be the recognition that every initiative of the United Nations system is doomed 
to failure as a result of the systemic pre-eminence of international economic 
law.  A second one might be, as the theorists of labour-led development suggest, 
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